In the context of a sequential search problem, I explore large-generations learning dynamics for agents who suffer from the "gambler's fallacy" -the statistical bias of anticipating too much regression to the mean for realizations of independent random events. Searchers are uncertain about search pool qualities of different periods but infer these fundamentals from search outcomes of the previous generation. Searchers' stopping decisions impose a censoring effect on the data of their successors, as the values they would have found in later periods had they kept searching remain unobserved. While innocuous for rational agents, this censoring effect interacts with the gambler's fallacy and creates a feedback loop between distorted stopping rules and pessimistic beliefs about search pool qualities of later periods. In general settings, the stopping rules used by different generations monotonically converge to a steady-state rule that stops searching earlier than optimal. In settings where true pool qualities increase over time -so there is option value in rejecting above-average early draws -learning is monotonically harmful and welfare strictly decreases across generations.
Introduction
Many suffer from the gambler's fallacy. They believe a fair coin has a higher chance of landing on tails after showing heads three times in a row, think a son is "due" to a woman who have given births to consecutive daughters, and in general expect sequential realizations of independent random events to regress to the mean more frequently than they do. Early experimental evidence of this statistical bias focused on the abstract domain of producing or recognizing i.i.d. random sequences based on a given alphabet of digits, letters, or colors (see Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) for a review). Recent work by Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016) has demonstrated this fallacy also affects experienced decision-makers in high-stakes settings, such as asylum court rulings and loan approval decisions. I provide a more detailed discussion of the empirical evidence in Section 1.1.
The prevalence and persistence of gambler's fallacy motivates studies about its implications in learning settings. Consider an agent who must learn about some fundamental state of the world from a dataset. While the dataset may reveal the true state to a rational learner who interprets the data correctly, a biased observer who views the data through the lens of gambler's fallacy can mislearn the state. In this paper, I start with a simple search model where the searcher suffers from the gambler's fallacy. Given the qualities of the search pools in different periods, the searcher dogmatically believes he should experience reversal in luck across periods, so that an unusually good search outcome in one period should be followed by an unusually bad one in the next period. That is, his subjective model of the game stipulates negative auto-correlation in search outcomes conditional on pool qualities. I then embed this search game as the stage game in a large-generations learning model. Each generation consists of many searchers each playing the search game once. Searchers face uncertainty about search pool qualities, but may infer these parameters from the game outcomes of their predecessors. Given the statistical bias, however, learners misinterpret their observations and misinfer the fundamentals.
Importantly, the stopping decisions of searchers in the previous generation impose a censoring effect on the data of the next generation: the future values that they would have found in their respective games had they kept searching longer are unobserved by the next generation. While the censoring effect is innocuous for rational learners, it interacts with the biased learners' gambler's fallacy to the detriment of their welfare. I show when the true qualities of the search pools are identical across periods and society's prior belief about the pool qualities are correct on average, learning is monotonically harmful: the average welfare in each generation t is strictly decreasing in t. This comes from a feedback cycle between the censoring effect and inference under gambler's fallacy. The fallacy leads one generation of agents to underestimate the search pool quality of the second period from censored data, which in turn leads them to lower their standards in the first period. But after this change in the stopping strategy, the censoring effect becomes more severe. The average quality of rejected early draws falls, which leads the next generation of agents to expect improved outcomes conditional on continuing into the second period by gambler's fallacy reasoning. When this improvement fails to materialize -because the early and late draws are in fact independent -the next generation of agents rationalize this observation by further decreasing their estimate of second-period pool quality. This, in turn, leads to accepting even worse draws in the first period. In the steady state, the biased searchers uses an acceptance threshold that is not only below the objectively optimal threshold, but also below the threshold they would have used if they instead saw the game outcomes generated in the t-th generation for any t = 0, 1, 2, ... This phenomenon of monotonically harmful learning crucially depends on the censoring effect -in an alternative model where agents observe all values that would have been found if their predecessors never stopped searching, a society of gambler fallacy agents nevertheless correctly infers the fundamentals and plays the objectively optimal stopping strategy in every generation. I also consider a number of extensions and robustness checks. The monotonically harmful learning result continues to hold even if learners correctly and dogmatically believe search pool quality is period-invariant. It also remains true if agents observe the outcomes of all previous generations instead of only that of the immediate predecessor generations. The baseline model assumes that draws in different periods are in objectively independent and that the searchers hold dogmatic belief in a certain negative correlation. However, the monotonically harmful learning result continues to obtain even if the draws have arbitrary objective correlation and learners entertain some uncertainty about the true correlation, provided the support of the learners' prior belief about the correlation falls below an upper bound. Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018) find a similar harmful learning pattern in the context of learners playing a static stage game with a different bias: overconfidence about own ability. But these results stem from two different sources. In addition to the assumed psychological bias, Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018) 's results depend on sign restrictions of cross partial derivatives of observable output, which ensures that initial action adjustments accentuate rather than dampen mislearning 1 . By contrast I consider a dynamic stage game, since gambler's fallacy is a behavioral bias concerning the serial correlation of data and only manifests in setting where multiple data points can be observed in each play of the game. Since the censoring effect relies on the timing of the game, it has no analog in a static-game setting. Also, the monotonicity of stopping threshold across generations holds generally in my model 2 , and is endogenously driven by the optimal stopping rule censoring future draws only after favorable early draws, rather than by exogenous assumptions on environmental primitives. Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010) were the first to study the inferential mistakes implied by gambler's fallacy. With the exception of an example in Rabin (2002) , all of their investigations have focused on passive inference where the learner's action does not affect his sample. Since gambler's fallacy is a statistical phenomenon, such investigation becomes especially nuanced in settings where the learner's actions affects statistical properties of his dataset. Will the feedback loop between learners' actions and biased beliefs attenuate or exaggerate the distortions caused by the fallacy?
Finally, when the gambler's fallacy subjective model specifies a different auto-correlation between draws in the search game than the objective auto-correlation, no estimate of the pool qualities of different periods fits the observed game outcomes exactly. I assume that agents in each generation observe an infinite number of games in the previous generation and end up with a doctrinaire belief in the fundamentals minimizing Kullback-Leibler divergence to the observed data. Across generations, play converges to a Berk-Nash equilibrium of Esponda and Pouzo (2016) . But rather than focusing only on equilibrium analysis, I focus on inter-generational learning dynamics to illustrate how censoring effect drives the society towards the suboptimal steady state step by step. In Section 6, I provide a justification of the learning dynamics I study as the limit of finite-population dynamics when population size tends to infinity.
Empirical Evidence on Gambler's Fallacy
Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) reviews classical psychology studies on gambler's fallacy. In "production tasks" where subjects are asked to produce i.i.d. random sequences using a given alphabet, they tend to generate sequences with too many alternations between symbols as they attempt to balance out their frequencies locally. In "judgment tasks" where subjects are asked to identify which sequence of binary symbols appears most "random", subjects find sequences with alternation probability 0.6 more random than those with alternation probability of 0.5. The gambler's fallacy persists in the lab even when subjects are given feedback about the randomness of the sequences they generate (Budescu, 1987) , or when they are playing the matching pennies game where the strategy of randomizing 50-50 between heads and tails is the minimax strategy (Rapoport and Budescu, 1992) . More recently, Barron and Leider (2010) showed that experiencing a streak of binary outcomes one at a time exacerbates the gambler's fallacy, compared with simply being told the past sequence of outcomes all at once. This suggests survey-based studies that elicit people's beliefs by verbally describing a scenario involving an unbalanced outcome will under-estimate the degree of gambler's fallacy that humans exhibit in real-life situations when they experience first-hand the unbalanced event taking place.
A number of other studies that have identified the gambler's fallacy using field data on lotteries and casino games. Unlike in experiments, agents in field settings are typically not explicitly told the underlying probabilities of the randomization devices. In state lotteries, players tend to avoid betting on numbers that have very recently won. This under-betting behavior is strictly costly for the players when lotteries have a pari-mutuel payout structure (as in the studies of Terrell (1994) and Suetens, Galbo-Jørgensen, and Tyran (2016) ), since it leads to a larger-than-average payout per winner in the event that the same number is drawn again in the following week. Using security video footage, Croson and Sundali (2005) show that roulette gamblers in casinos bet more on a color after a long streak of the opposite color. Narayanan and Manchanda (2012) use individual-level data tracked using casino loyalty cards to find that a larger recent win has a negative effect on the next bet that the gambler places, while a larger recent loss increases the size of the next bet. This result extends gambler's fallacy beyond the binary outcomes domain and suggests the same psychology also operates for continuous outcomes, with the severity of the recent bad outcome believed to foretell the degree mean reversal "due" in the near future. Finally, using data from the diverse areas of asylum granting, loan approvals, and baseball umpire calls, Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016) show that even very experienced decision-makers show a tendency to alternate between two decisions across a sequence of randomly ordered decision problems. This can be explained by gambler's fallacy, as the fallacy leads to the belief that the objectively "correct" decision is negatively autocorrelated across the sequence of decision problems. The authors rule out a number of other explanations including contrast effect and quotas.
As Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010) have argued, someone who dogmatically believes in the gambler's fallacy must attribute the lack of reversals in the data to the fundamental probabilities of the randomizing device, leading to overinference from small dataset. This overinference can be seen in the field data. Cumulative win/loss (as opposed to very recent win/loss) on a casino trip is positively correlated with the size of future bets (Narayanan and Manchanda, 2012) . A player who believes in the gambler's fallacy rationalizes his persistent good luck on a particular day by thinking he must be in a "hot" state, where his fundamental probability of winning in each game is higher than usual. In a similar vein, a number that has been drawn more often in past 6 weeks, excluding the most recent past week, gets more bets in the Denmark lottery (Suetens, Galbo-Jørgensen, and Tyran, 2016) . This kind of overinference result from small samples persists even in a market setting where participants have had several rounds of experience and feedback (Camerer, 1987) . In line with these evidence, the model I consider involves learners who dogmatically believe in the gambler's fallacy and misinfer some parameter of the world as a result.
Model

The Stage Game
The stage game is a two-period search problem. A searcher draws value X 1 in the first period. The searcher decides between accepting it and ending the game, or rejecting it in order to search again in the second period. Accepting X 1 gives payoff X 1 . Rejecting it allows the the searcher to draw a new value X 2 in second period, which he must then accept as his payoff. The X 1 from the previous period cannot be recalled. This model can represent an unemployed worker deciding whether to accept an exploding job offer, a firm choosing between hiring an early applicant or waiting for later applicants, etc. I will stick to the second interpretation and think of X 1 , X 2 as the qualities of the early and late applicant who apply to the position, and their (potentially different) distributions as the distributions of qualities in the early and late applicant pools.
Objectively, X 1 , X 2 are independently drawn from Gaussian distributions X 1 ∼ N (µ
are the true qualities of the early-and late-applicant pools. The hiring manager, however, suffers from gambler's fallacy. He believes that if he gets lucky and the early applicant is an especially good fit, then bad luck is "due" in the near future and the late applicant is most likely below average. Conversely, an exceptionally bad early applicant likely portends he will have above average luck in the next hiring phase. Formally, the manager's subjective model is that X 1 and X 2 are jointly Gaussian with the distribution
for some µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ R and ρ < 0. Before observing outcomes of previous games, if any, the manager is uncertain about µ 1 and µ 2 . However, he is dogmatic in his belief about ρ < 0 and will not revise this aspect of his mental model in light of data. The greater the distance between ρ and 0, the more severely the manager suffers from gambler's fallacy. The manager's dogmatic belief in ρ is restrictive, but allows me to focus attention on the learning implications of gambler's fallacy in the search problem. As Section 5.3 shows, results are unchanged if the manager also updates his belief about the correlation coefficient from data, provided the support of his prior belief lies to the left of 0 and is bounded away from it. This assumption seems broadly in line with Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016) 's analysis of field data, showing that even very experienced decision-makers continue to exhibit a non-negligible amount of the gambler's fallacy in high-stakes settings.
Though X 1 and X 2 are continuous random variables, I interpret the manager's wrong belief about the correlation in the candidate qualities as coming from the same psychology that leads people to mispredict the likelihood of another heads toss after a fair coin lands on heads multiple times in a row. In this model, an X 1 realization far above the mean µ 1 is like a sequence of heads in a row -a highly unbalanced outcome that must be followed with an X 2 far below µ 2 if the sample is to be overall representative of the population means.
I focus on the case where the manager believes µ 1 , µ 2 are fixed. In practice, if the manager is hiring for multiple positions that vary in the ease of finding a good fit, then a good early applicant for one job is informative that the late applicant for the same job is also likely to be good. In other words, µ 1 and µ 2 may themselves be random variables drawn from a correlated distribution. In the baseline model, I abstract away from that channel of inference, assuming the manager knows µ 1 , µ 2 are the same for all jobs. Section 5.4 deals with the case where µ 1 , µ 2 are randomly drawn across different games.
A Large-Generations Learning Model
There are generations of managers, each playing the stage game once. They start with the same full-support prior beliefs about the fundamentals µ • 2 , which are given by density functions g 1 , g 2 : R → R ++ . They know that the fundamentals are the same in all the games, but dogmatically and wrongly believe in some ρ < 0.
The 0th generation of managers play the stage game without any historical information. Managers in generations t ≥ 1 are told the strategy of generation t − 1 managers. They also observe the outcomes of all games played in generation t − 1. When a manager decides to hire the early applicant in a game, only the realization of X 1 will be observed by the next generation. If the manager searches for a second applicant, then the realizations of both X 1 and X 2 are observed. This means the optimal stopping strategies of generation t − 1 endogenously impose a censoring effect on the observations of generation t. If the t − 1 generation's strategy stipulates stopping in period 1 after the draw X 1 = x, then whenever X 1 = x its associated X 2 value becomes censored in the dataset available to generation t. Thus this is a model where action (of the previous generation) affects information, in contrast to the literature that has focused on biased learners passively forming inference from observing an exogenous flow of information outside of his control, such as stock prices (Rabin, 2002; Rabin and Vayanos, 2010) .
Importantly, managers do not assume that others are rational. While they use the game outcomes of previous generation to infer the fundamentals, they do not reason through why previous managers made the hiring decisions and so they infer nothing from the strategies of the previous generation of managers. As the analysis of the learning dynamics will show, the strategies of different generations converge, so that asymptotically managers find the strategies of the previous generation approximately optimal given their own beliefs about the fundamentals. Section 5.2 considers a modified learning model where each generation observes the outcomes of all games in all previous generations. In that setting we may assume common knowledge of rationality among the managers, as each generation t already observes all the information that generation s < t observed, so there is nothing more to infer from the actions of generation s. It turns out the managers will still converge to the same steady state as when they observe only the immediate predecessor generation and do not assume rationality of others, though the speed of convergence to the steady state may slow down.
I consider the case where there are infinitely many managers in each generation. As shown in Section 6, if each manager in generation t ≥ 1 observes N independent game outcomes of generation t − 1 all generated using cutoff c, then as N → ∞, his posterior beliefs about µ
and µ
• 2 almost surely concentrate on the pseudo-true models -the models in the support of his prior belief closest to the data-generating model in the Kullback-Leibler divergence sense. In the next section, we will see that the pseudo-true model is unique. I assume that the belief dynamic between generations are given by this deterministic transition between point mass beliefs, greatly simplifying the analysis.
Results
Cutoff Threshold and Endogenous Inference
For a manager who knows the true values of µ
and correctly believes ρ = 0, the optimal strategy is to accept any first-period applicant whose quality is above µ On the other hand, given any fixed values of the fundamental µ 1 , µ 2 and the dogmatic belief in ρ < 0, the conditional distribution of X 2 given
This leads us to: 
Proof. Since ρ < 0, a larger first-period draw x 1 both increases the payoff from stopping right away and decreases the manager's perceived continuation value from searching again, since he believes the expected quality of the second-period candidate is decreasing in x 1 . So, the manager's strategy has a cutoff form. The value of the cutoff comes from the indifference condition: the manager is indifferent between hiring a candidate of qualityĉ and continuing onto the second period, soĉ(
For a manager holding independent beliefs about the mean qualities of candidates in the two periods given by densities g 1 and g 2 , the expected second-period payoff conditional on observing and rejecting a first-period candidate of quality
, where g 1 (·|x 1 ) refers to the Bayesian posterior density about the first-period fundamental after an observation of x 1 in the early period. To ensure that the optimal strategy still has the cutoff form, I introduce the following regularity assumption that will be maintained throughout:
This assumption says the posterior mean of the first period fundamental does not update too quickly after a single observation. This assumption is satisfied, for example, for any Gaussian distribution g 1 (·; a, b
2 ). In that case, 
Proof. Under Assumption 1, the expected quality of second-period applicant is again decreasing in observed first-period applicant quality. So the optimal strategy is again a cutoff rule, with the value of the cutoff given by the indifference condition.
We now turn to the inference problem: suppose all managers from generation t − 1 use the same cutoff threshold c ∈ R, as would be the case if they all hold the same beliefs about the fundamentals. What would managers in generation t infer about µ
Since the data-generating process is that X 1 and X 2 are independent, for any c and any ρ < 0, no model within the class of misperceived models
fits the t − 1 period data exactly. As in Esponda and Pouzo (2016) , we consider the model that is closest to the data in the sense of Kullback-Leibler divergence. The KL divergence of the game outcomes under cutoff strategy c, between the true data-generating process and the model
where φ(z) is the standard Gaussian density and φ(x; a, b 2 ) is Gaussian density with mean a and variance b 2 .
Proposition 3. The KL divergence is minimized byμ 1 (c) = µ
To interpret, the period t managers correctly estimate the mean quality of early applicants, but misperceives the mean quality of late applicants in a way that depends on the degree of gambler's fallacy bias, the true mean of the early applicants, and importantly the cutoff used by the previous generation. To understand why the cutoff c matters for inference about µ
• 2 , consider that the threshold used in period t − 1 censors the game outcomes, so that X 2 is only observed in the event that X 1 ≤ c. When c decreases, the average early applicant quality conditional on observing the late applicant quality also decreases. While objectively X 2 is independently of X 1 , the managers' gambler fallacy reasoning leads them to think that the worse the early applicant, the better the late applicant is likely to be. Holding fixed the quality of the late applicant, the managers' inference about µ • 2 is therefore decreasing in the quality of the early applicant. As in Rabin (2002) 's fund manager example, the endogenous censoring of observations turns the symmetric gambler's fallacy into an asymmetric inference thatμ 2 (c) < µ
The misinference comes from the gambler's fallacy, not from selection neglect. The biased learners understand that X 2 is censored when X 1 ≥ c, and their estimation procedure takes this into account. Indeed, it is precisely this understanding that leads them astray in their inference. If the gambler fallacy agents also suffer from selection neglect, in the sense that they treat the game outcome data as a sample from N (µ 
Proof. Rewrite the objective function as
which is:
, so we may simplify the first term and the inner integral of the second term.
Dropping constant terms not depending on µ 1 and µ 2 , we get a simplified expression of the objective,
We have the partial derivatives by differentiating under the integral sign,
By the first order conditions, at the minimum (µ * 1 , µ * 2 ), we must have:
The divergence-minimizing inference has a method-of-moments interpretation. The managers always observe X 1 and their inferenceμ 1 (c) = µ • 1 matches the mean of observed first-period quality. Having fixedμ 1 (c), the second-period quality that the manager expects to see conditional on
, whereμ 2 is his inference about second-period fundamental. In reality, he sees an average quality of µ
It is interesting that the inference about µ • 1 is exactly correct. Managers can rationalize the lack of expected reversals between the two periods in two ways: either the second period mean quality is low (so that the observed X 2 are in fact above second-period mean), or the first period mean quality is low (so that the rejected early applicants are not much below first period mean and not much good luck is "due" in the second period). One might imagine that slightly distorting belief about µ • 1 downwards can help fit second-period data better at the expense of a small cost in fitting first-period data. The intuition here is that the first-period data is always observed while the second-period data is only sometimes observed, so this kind of distortion is always leads to a worse overall fit.
The Steady State and Learning Dynamics
Now I turn to the long-run limit of the generations learning model. I first define the steady state and prove its existence and uniqueness. I then show that generations converge monotonically to the steady state starting from any full-support prior.
Definition 1.
A steady state consists of (point mass) beliefs µ ∞ 1 , µ ∞ 2 ∈ R and a threshold strategy c ∞ ∈ R such that:
2. belief minimizes KL divergence given the cutoff, µ
Note that the steady-state belief is endogenously determined by the steady-state cutoff, which "censors" pairs (X 1 , X 2 ) with X 1 > c ∞ from the learner's sample.
To prove the existence and uniqueness of the steady state, I consider the following belief iteration map about the second-period fundamental,
For t ≥ 1, generation t managers observe the outcomes of generation t − 1 and update their beliefs about µ 
. By Proposition 3, this leads the next generation of managers to infer µ
Thus, from generation t to generation t + 1, the point mass belief about µ
2 ). Clearly, in any steady state we have to have µ
) and we have a steady state. So there is a one-to-one relationship between fixed points of T and steady states. Figure 1 illustrates the first few applications of T , in an environment with µ While there is a positive feedback loop between the censoring effect and gambler's fallacy, this feedback does not cause beliefs and actions to run off to infinity across generations. To see this, observe that when belief about second-period fundamental becomes more pessimistic by 1 unit, Proposition 1 implies the induced cutoff strategy decreases by 1 1−ρ < 1 units. And when the cutoff strategy decreases by 1 unit from c to c , Proposition 3 says belief about the second-period fundamental becomes more pessimistic by |ρ|
units. It turns out that for the Gaussian distribution, the magnitude of difference in conditional expectations
is bounded by the distance in the two conditioning cutoffs |c − c |. Putting together these two halves of the feedback loop, we see that the overall gain around the loop is positive but less than 1. This is the intuition behind why T is a contraction mapping.
I now give a complete characterization of the generations-based learning dynamics. The next proposition says depending on whether the generation 1 managers hold a belief about lateapplicant pool quality that is above or below the unique steady-state belief about that quality, beliefs µ (t) 2 converge monotonically either upwards or downwards towards the steady-state belief. The monotonicity of beliefs across generations in turn leads to a monotonic change in the acceptance cutoff threshold for early applicants. This pair of monotonicity results comes from the positive feedback loop between censoring effect and inference. Since
∂µ 2 > 0, a more pessimistic belief about second-period pool quality leads to a lower acceptance threshold, hence a more severe censoring of the dataset. But we also have ∂μ 2 (c) ∂c > 0, which says the pseudo-true belief about the late-applicant pool quality becomes more pessimistic as the censoring effect becomes more severe.
Proposition 5. If µ (1) 2 is larger than the unique steady-state belief µ 
and the cutoff strategies also converge c
Proof. I show this for the case of µ
for any generations t and t + 1, then we must have µ
2 for all s ≥ t. This is because we have both
, and so forth. This shows if the beliefs about the second-period fundamental ever weakly increases between two periods, then either lim t→∞ µ
2 converges to some belief strictly higher than µ ∞ 2 . The former is impossible since for any cutoff c,μ 2 (c) < µ • 2 . The latter, by the continuity of both the best response cutoffĉ and the inferenceμ 2 , would imply there is an additional steady state above µ ∞ 2 , which contradicts the uniqueness of the steady state. So far I have shown that if µ
2 is strictly decreasing every period. Next note
2 ) is a decreasing sequence bounded below by µ ∞ 2 . Such a sequence converges, and if it converges to a point strictly larger than µ ∞ 2 , again we would contradict the uniqueness of the steady state.
In the first few generations, there is an ambiguous comparison between managers' beliefs and cutoffs under gambler's fallacy and under correct specifications. Consider for example a generation of managers with correct beliefs about fundamentals, µ
, then rational strategy specifies rejecting some candidates who are better than average in the first period. But at the rational cutoff, the biased managers fear that the lucky draw this periods predicts worse than average luck next period, so the biased stopping cutoff is lower. Conversely by a symmetric argument, if µ
1 then the biased cutoff will be higher than the rational one.
However, learning disciplines this prediction and shows that in the steady state, c ∞ < c
That is, the managers eventually act as-if they are under-appreciating option value and accept early candidates whose qualities are too low. Proof. To see that µ
The term in the bracket is negative, and so is ρ, therefore µ
To compare c ∞ with c • , we know that by optimality c ∞ must maximize:
where byÊ I mean the expectation under the biased model and steady state beliefs, that
. On the other hand, the rational cutoff c ∞ maximizes the true objective
First order condition impliesf (c ∞ ) = 0, which means f (c ∞ ) > 0. So the rational cutoff c
• is to the right of c ∞ .
In the steady state, managers are optimizing the wrong objective functionf (c) : 
, which is the key in deriving the unambiguous prediction. The managers correctly know the expected second-period payoff if they use the steady-state cutoff c ∞ , but wrongly believe that increasing this cutoff will lead to a worse second-period payoff. So if the cutoff c ∞ is optimal under this wrong set of beliefs, a rational manager must strictly prefer to increase the cutoff.
The above discussion shows a connection between the structure of the steady state in this learning problem and Esponda (2008)'s behavioral equilibrium. In Esponda's world, buyers in a bilateral trade situation offer a price p, which sellers with different quality goods accept or reject. The buyer correctly knows the expected quality of the trade conditional on a seller accepting the price p, but holds wrong beliefs about the quality consequences of a deviation. Whereas Esponda (2008) had no explicit mechanism for how these beliefs about deviation consequences are formed, in my learning problem there is a model for the precise misspecification of the learners. As such, these deviation beliefs are pinned down by the gambler's fallacy.
When Is Learning Harmful?
If µ
and the prior beliefs are accurate on average, that is to say
, then learning leads to a vicious feedback cycle that leads managers further and further away from the objectively optimal cutoff in each generation. To understand the intuition, the 0th generation managers use only their prior to make their strategy choice. The rational cutoff c
is above their average belief in terms of early applicant quality, so their gambler's fallacy reasoning leads them to conclude that X 2 will on average fall below µ
Observing the game outcomes where X 2 is censored if X 1 > c (0) , the generation 1 managers are surprised to see so few reversals in X 2 following low values of X 1 . Since they have a dogmatic belief in ρ < 0, they must attribute the unexpectedly bad second period payoff to a low fundamental µ
2 < µ • 2 . This belief updating will lead to a new cutoff c (1) < c (0) , because the more pessimistic beliefs about X 2 gives greater incentive to accept worse candidates in the first period. But in period 2, the new managers will be again disappointed even at the lower expectations µ (1) 2 about the second period fundamental, since the best-fitting inference about µ • 2 decreases as the data-generating cutoff threshold c decreases while (X 1 , X 2 ) remain objectively independent. This means the generation 2 inference must be revised further downwards, µ (2) 2 < µ (1) 2 . By the belief and strategy dynamics in Proposition 5, we have c (t) ↓ c ∞ . But c (0) was already below the objectively optimal cutoff, so expected welfare is decreasing across generations. We have a spiral of downward adjustments of belief in fundamental and cutoff threshold that feed into each other, moving the managers further and further away from the objectively optimal strategy.
The next proposition describes a slightly broader class of situations where this monotonically harmful learning takes place.
, then welfare is strictly and monotonically decreasing across generations from t = 1 onwards. This includes the case where µ We have seen that if agents start with accurate beliefs and if the objectively optimal strategy involves rejecting better-than-average early candidates, then learning can make things worse in every generation. Conversely, if the the initial prior beliefs about µ • 2 are wildly inaccurate, then the primary effect of learning is to correct most of these inaccuracies and learning will lead to an overall improvement. The next proposition shows that if initial beliefs about µ 
Turning Off the Censoring Effect
In the natural case with µ
and on-average accurate prior Gaussian beliefs, that is to say
, Proposition 7 says a harmful learning spiral happens where each successive generation moves further away from the objectively optimal cutoff threshold. In this section, I look at some modifications of the baseline model to show that this harmful learning results emerges from the interaction of the gambler's fallacy bias and the endogenous sampling in the dynamic stage game. The results in this section imply that if the managers do not suffer form gambler's fallacy, then they will learn to use the objectively optimal cutoff even in the presence of the endogenous feedback issue (Proposition 9). Also consider a counterfactual full-observations world where the generation t+1 managers observe what X 2 would have resulted in each of the previous generation's games, even those games where the early candidate was hired. Then even in the presence of the gambler's fallacy bias, the managers will learn to use the objectively optimal cutoff (Proposition 10). More generally, in the broader class of all parameter values described by Proposition 7, I show that full-observation limits the harmfulness of learning by removing the feedback loop between lower acceptance threshold of early applicants and worse inference about the quality of later applicants. With full observations, welfare increases.
Proof. The correct model is within the class of possible models of the learner when ρ = 0. Regardless of the cutoff c (t−1) ∈ R used by the previous generation, only the correct model matches the censored distribution of (X 1 , X 2 ). So, µ
By the "full-observation" model, I mean a modified learning model where generation t + 1 observes the (X 1 , X 2 ) pairs associated with all stage games in generation t, even those games where the previous manager stopped searching by the end of period 1. Proof. Under full observations, regardless of the cutoff used by the previous generation, the inferred fundamentalsμ 1 andμ 2 minimize the full-observations KL divergence,
Performing rearrangements similar to the proof of Proposition 3, we find thatμ 1 andμ 2 must minimize:
Again by similar arguments we find the unique pair solving the first-order conditions,μ 1 = µ
This shows that for all t ≥ 1, µ
In particular, the strategy is the same for all generations t ≥ 1, and in fact it is the same as the strategy in generation 0 of the baseline model. Proposition 7 showed that in the baseline model, c
the full-feedback world has strictly higher welfare.
• 2 in each period as before. The cutoff in each period iŝ c(µ
, then the welfare comparison between the baseline model and full observation is ambiguous. From Proposition 6, we know that in the baseline model, the steady state cutoff will be too low, c ∞ < c • . However, under the full observation model, the steady state cutoff will be too high. Consider a biased manager who correctly knows the average applicant qualities in both periods. Since µ
, the rational cutoff involves the manager accepting some early applicants who are worse than average. The biased manager interprets finding one of these low quality applicants in the first period as "bad luck", and expects reversal in luck in the second period. So he will be choosier than the correctly specified manager. The smaller the rational cutoff c
2 is compared to the first-period mean µ • 1 , the worse luck the biased manager attributes to finding a candidate around this cutoff, and hence the greater reversal he expects in the next period. This means the distortion of the biased acceptance threshold above the objectively optimal one is increasing in µ 
Extensions
Managers Who Believe the Two Applicant Pools are Identical
Suppose in truth µ
• , and managers dogmatically believe in this (as well as in some fixed ρ < 0). I first characterize the inferenceμ 12 (c) that generation t managers would make about this fundamental, given that game outcomes in the previous generation were induced by the cutoff c.
Proposition 11.μ 12 (c) =
The estimatorsμ (c) minimize the KL divergences of first-and second-period observations, respectively. The overall KL divergence minimizing estimator is a certain convex combination between these two points. Through the term P[X 1 ≤ c], the relative weight given toμ cons 2 (c) increases as the cutoff c increases, because the second-period data is observed more often if previous managers have used a more stringent cutoff in the first period. (c) = µ • , which shows that for any cutoff c that the previous generation may have used, the next generation underestimates the fundamental. Since each generation's optimal cutoff strategy c (t) given belief µ (t) is c (t) = µ (t) , this shows the cutoff is too low in each generation, and so in particular it is too low in the steady state.
We haveμ cons 2 (c) >μ 2 (c) from Proposition 3 since | ρ 1−ρ | < |ρ|, henceμ 12 (c) >μ 2 (c). In the setting where managers start with a dogmatic belief that the applicant pools are identical in both periods, their beliefs about second-period fundamental end up less pessimistic relative to managers who can flexibly estimate differentμ 1 andμ 2 for the two periods.
In general, we no longer have ∂μ 12 ∂c > 0. This is because decreasing the censoring threshold c now has two opposite effects. First, a smaller c leads the gambler's fallacy managers to expect greater reversal towards better-than-average candidates in the second period, conditional on the first-period candidate being rejected, so they infer a worse second-period fundamental µ cons 2 (c). But at the same time, a lower c decreases the weight given toμ cons 2 (c), since the second data is observed less frequently and so carries less weight in the overall divergence minimizing procedure.
Indeed, as the following plot shows, the effect of cutoff c on inference about the fundamental is in general non-monotonic. 
Observing All Past Generations
In the large-generations learning model, generation t managers do not infer anything from the actions of generation t − 1 managers, since they do not assume the rationality of other players. As cutoffs converge to the unique steady-state cutoff c ∞ , all late enough generations would find the cutoffs that their immediate predecessors used approximately optimal given their own beliefs. However, some early generations may change their strategies by a nonnegligible amount if they were to invert their predecessors' actions into their implied beliefs and use this additional information in inferring about the fundamentals.
I now turn to an extension where the learning model delivers the same prediction in every generation, regardless of whether managers know that others are rational.
Suppose managers in generation t ≥ 1 observe all game outcomes from all past generations (APG), not only the outcomes of generation t − 1. Using APG data, generation t managers update their posterior belief about µ
, which again they know to be constant across all games in all generations. Since generation t sees all the information that generation s < t saw, generation t can glean no additional information from the strategy of generation s, and in addition generation t would agree that generation s chose a rational strategy given their information. If generations 0, 1, 2, ..., t−1 have used cutoff strategies c 0 , c 1 , ..., c t−1 , then as generation size N → ∞, the posterior belief of generation t almost surely concentrates on the minimizers of the following Kullback-Leibler divergence objective:
I now turn to the deterministic belief dynamics where each generation t is assumed to hold the point-mass belief on the unique minimizers µ
of the above objective. This uniqueness is established in the next proposition, which also shows that after observing data generated by cutoffs c 0 , ..., c t−1 in generations 0, ... t − 1, generation t's posterior belief about the fundamentals can be computed by taking a weighted average of the t different beliefs that the data in each of the past t generations would have generated.
Proposition 13. The minimizers of Equation (1) 
Intuitively speaking, generation t's inference has to accommodate data from t previous generations, which are censored using t potentially different cutoffs. While the biased generation t managers would draw the same inference about µ 1 using data from any of these past generation, the data of different past generations lead to different beliefs about µ 2 . The relative weight that generation k data gets depends on the cutoff c k that its managers used, since this cutoff affects how many complete pairs (X 1 , X 2 ) are observed in this generation relative to other generations.
Next, I characterize the learning dynamics in the APG observations environment. It turns out APG observations lead to the same steady state as the environment where learners only observe the immediate predecessor generation. The intuition is that as belief converges across generations, eventually managers in all late-enough generations will use very similar cutoffs. So the APG outcomes are similar to the outcomes of the immediate predecessor generation, as the vast majority of the previous generations will be using very similar cutoff strategies.
Also, while in the long-run both APG and the one-generation lookback models behave the same way, they can differ in their short-run welfare. For example, in settings where learning leads generations further and further astray from the objectively optimal strategy, the APG environment slows down this harmful learning, as game outcomes from the early generations were censored using a higher cutoff, and thus lead to a less pessimistic inference about the second-period fundamental. 
Uncertainty about ρ
Now I consider the generalization where managers jointly estimate µ 1 , µ 2 , and ρ from data. While their prior beliefs about µ 1 and µ 2 have full support on R, I assume their prior about ρ is supported on the interval [r,r] ⊆ [−1, 1]. The next proposition generalizes Proposition 3. It shows that when the unit-variance, jointly normal random variables (X 1 , X 2 ) have an objective correlation of r
• , and when the support of the learner's belief about the correlation satisfiedr < −|r • |, then the pseudo-true model involves a correlation ofr between X 1 and X 2 and beliefs about the means are analogous to Proposition 3 given this correlation.
Proposition 15. Suppose the applicant abilities are distributed according to
independently across different games, with σ 2 > 0 and −σ 2 < r • < σ 2 . Suppose the learner's prior is supported on the following class of models,
The model that minimizes the KL divergence to
the data generated by censoring X 2 whenever X 1 > c isr =r,μ 1 = µ
In Proposition 15, the restrictions r > −σ 2 andr < σ 2 simply ensure that the resulting covariance matrix is positive semi-definite for any r ∈ [r,r]. One may intuitively guess that the pseudo-true model should pick out the correlation coefficient in the support of the learner's prior that is closest to the true correlation in the Euclidean sense, so one may expect Proposition 15 to hold even whenr = −0.1 and r • = 0.5. But, this is false 3 .
Suppose X 1 and X 2 are in fact positively correlated. Compared with a model stipulating no correlation between X 1 and X 2 , a model with negative correlation does a worse job at fitting the conditional mean of X 2 |X 1 , as it expects X 2 to be lower on average when X 1 is higher. But at the same time, it also does a better job at fitting the conditional variance, since both positive and negative correlation between X 1 and X 2 lead to X 2 having a lower conditional variance (given X 1 ) than an unconditional variance. This trade-off means sometimes a correlation coefficient further away from the true correlation in the Euclidean distance metric is actually closer under the KL distance metric. The condition thatr < −|r • | rules out some pathological cases where the set of subjectively possible correlations between X 1 and X 2 is bounded away from the true correlation, yet divergence is minimized at a model with a correlation not on the boundary of the parameter space.
3 As a numerical example, one can compute that when µ
.5, c = −3, the lowest possible divergence in the subclass of models withr = −0.1,μ 1μ2 ∈ R is 3.24 × 10 −5 , but the lowest possible variance in the subclass of models withr = −0.4,μ 1μ2 ∈ R is 2.71 × 10 −5 . This means that when r is allowed to vary in the interval [−0.5, −0.1], say, the minimum divergence model does not feature a boundary value ofr = −0.1, even though this is the closest correlation (in the Euclidean metric) to the data-generating correlation of 0.5. 
Random Applicant Pool Qualities
Suppose in reality the candidate abilities are generated using a two-step process. First, the qualities of the early-and late-applicants pools are realized,
• < 1 is the true correlation between the pools. For example, jobs may differ in the degree of required specialization. Very few applicants would be a good fit for a niche job requiring narrow specialization, whereas there are a lot more suitable workers for a more general position. In that case, we may expect an objective positive correlation of ρ • > 0 between the qualities of early and late search pools.
After the pool qualities are realized, the qualities of the early and late applicants are drawn centered around their realized means and independently of each other,
We have (X 1 , X 2 ) conditionally independent given (μ 1 ,μ 2 ), but their ex-ante distribution follows
and they have an unconditional correlation of −0.5 < ρ • /2 < 0.5.
The gambler-fallacy managers dogmatically believe the conditional distribution (X 1 , X 2 )|(μ 1 ,μ 2 ) exhibits mean reversion relative to the mean qualities of the pools,
for some −1 < ρ − < 0. So, when managers believe the random pool qualities to have meanŝ µ 1 andμ 2 with a correlation ofρ, their subjective model of the unconditional distribution of (X 1 , X 2 ) follows
Proposition 16 
Then under deterministic generational learning dynamics, welfare strictly decreases across generations.
A Finite-Populations Foundation for the Deterministic Dynamics
Formally, consider a learning environment with N < ∞ agents in each generation t for t = 0, 1, 2, ... All agents start with independent prior beliefs about µ 
2 ) t≥1 refer to the sequences of cutoff strategies and doctrinaire beliefs about second-period fundamental induced by the deterministic learning dynamics. The goal of this section is to explain in what sense the belief and behavior dynamics of the finite-population model converge to that of the deterministic system as N → ∞.
All managers in generation 0 choose cutoff c (0) according to their prior beliefs. Starting from generation t ≥ 1, each generation t manager observes the game outcome (X n , Y n ) of each manager 1 ≤ n ≤ N in the predecessor generation t − 1. If manager n in generation t − 1 searched for two periods, then X n = X 1,n and Y n = X 2,n where (X 1,n , X 2,n ) refer to the qualities of the early and late applicants in manager n's game. If manager n only searched for one period, then X n = X 1,n but Y n ∼ N (0, 1) is a white noise term that is independent of applicant qualities of any game. Generation t managers are told the cutoff used by generation t − 1, so they know which Y n are white noise and they can infer nothing about the fundamentals from noise. Having managers observe the noise term, as opposed to a fixed indicator that the second-period quality is censored, lets me conveniently describe the distribution of game outcome (X n , Y n ) using a full-support density function on R 2 . The specific parametric form of the white noise term does not matter for the results.
For each generation size N < ∞, the cutoffs and beliefs about early and late pool qualities form stochastic processes (c
n is a random variable valued in R, µ (t) 1,n and µ (t) 2,n are random posterior beliefs on R. The randomness comes from the random realizations of applicant qualities in different games. I wish to show that, in some sense, for every t we have lim N →∞ c
2 . In Lemma 1, I provide a first step towards this conjecture, showing that if the cutoff strategy of generation t − 1 were fixed at c (t−1) , then as N → ∞ the random strategy of generation t almost surely converges to c (t) . Berk (1966) does not imply convergence of behavior in this setting, because his result only establishes that for any open set containing the pseudotrue model, the posterior belief assigned to the open set almost surely converges to 1. Yet the supports of g 1 and g 2 are unbounded, so this leaves open the possibility that for large N, posterior belief assigns small probability to extremely large values of second-period fundamental. If the magnitude of this extreme value grows more quickly in N than the speed with which probability concentrates on the open set around the pseudotrue model, then the first generation behavior c (1) N can remain bounded away from c (1) for all N . Instead, the proof of Lemma 1 relies on Bunke and Milhaud (1998) , who provide a concentration result in the stronger sense of expected distance of the posterior model from the pseudotrue model. 
This also implies that almost surely, lim N →∞c
Regardless of N , all managers in the 0th generation uses their prior beliefs g 1 , g 2 and play the cutoff c (0) . So an immediate implication of Lemma 1 is that almost surely, generation 1's behavior converges to c (1) as population size grows large. Also, their posterior beliefs about first-and second-period fundamentals almost surely converge to the values given by Proposition 3.
However, starting with generation 2, the problem becomes more complicated because the action of generation 1 is random for any finite N . Lemma 1 only assures us that for any fixed play c of generation 1, the posterior beliefs of generation 2 converge to (µ 
2,N (c) refer to the random posteriors generated when generation (t − 1)'s game outcomes are censored according to cutoff c.
Intuitively this should be true because both the data-generating density and the model densities behave nicely with respect to c. If this conjecture holds, then it follows easily that almost surely lim N →∞ c
7 Appendix: Relegated Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. It suffices to show T is a contraction mapping. We have
By formula of the mean of a truncated Gaussian random variable,
is the Gaussian inverse Mills ratio and it is well-known that its derivative is bounded by 1 in magnitude 4 . By symmetry this also applies to the function
. This means
| < 1, which shows T is a contraction mapping.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Since c (1) > c ∞ and µ 2 →ĉ(µ
. By Proposition 5, we must then have µ 
2 ). We know thatĉ(µ
, and at the same time
andĉ is increasing in its second argument. This shows that c (1) =ĉ(µ
2 ) < µ
Step 2: c (1) > c ∞ .
I have just shown that c (1) <ĉ(µ
• 2 ). These two facts combined imply that µ (2) 2 < µ (1) 2 sinceμ 2 (·) is an increasing function, so c (2) < c (1) as well.
By Proposition 5, the sequence of c (t) must decrease to c ∞ , which means we must have started out with c
To show that c (0) ≥ĉ(µ
• 2 ), observe that for managers holding priors g 1 , g 2 , observing an early candidate with ability x =ĉ(µ
2 ) leads to an expectation of late candidate having ability
since g 1 is symmetric and centered around µ • 1 . This shows above expression is weakly larger than µ
, which means generation 0 finds it weakly better to search for a second candidate if the first one has abilityĉ(µ 
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Let µ 
Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3, the KL divergence of the gambler's fallacy model with parameterμ relative to the data-generating process, when observations are censored by cutoff c can be written as
Dropping constant terms not depending on µ, we get a simplified expression of the objective,
Setting the first-order condition to 0 and using straightforward algebra,
Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. The 0th generation is indifferent between continuing or stopping if first candidate has quality X 1 = µ
• . This is because due to symmetry of g,
bler's fallacy manager expects second-period candidate quality to be
Now, note that under the point-mass belief µ (t) about the fundamental, period t managers will choose c (t) = µ (t) .
for some T ≥ 1. We will show that we also get c
From the proof of Proposition 11, eachμ (t) for t ≥ 1 minimizes the objective f (µ; c) :
dx with c = c (t−1) , which has the derivatives:
we need only establish that for any µ ≥ µ (T ) , we have ∂f ∂µ
) cannot be minimized at any belief more optimistic than the period T belief of µ (T ) . Since we already have
by the inductive hypothesis). We have (µ
Proposition 11, and also µ (T ) −c = c (T ) −c < 0 for c in the range (c (T ) , c (T −1) ). This shows the negativity of the cross partial derivative in the desired range, and establishes µ (T +1) < µ (T ) and c (T +1) < c (T ) . Now by induction the sequence c (t) is strictly decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. By the same algebraic manipulations in the proof of Proposition 3, we may rewrite the objective in Equation (1) as:
Dropping terms not dependent on µ 1 and µ 2 , we get the simplified objective
The same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3 gives µ 1 = µ • 1 as the only value satisfying the first-order conditions, and following this the minimizing µ 2 must satisfy
Since the derivative
is a linear function of µ 2 , we can rearrange to find
Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. I establish this for the case of µ (1) given by Proposition 13, . So we are finished by induction. The other case of c (1) ,APG < c (0),APG is symmetric.
Step 2: (µ
) t≥1 is bounded. 
Proof of Proposition 15
Proof.
Step 1: Divergence expression.
The divergence of the model parametrized by (μ 1 ,μ 2 ,r) and the data is
where φ(x; µ, σ 2 ) stands for the Gaussian density function with mean µ and variance σ 2 .
Performing analogous rearrangements as in the proof of Proposition 3, the divergence can be rewritten as:
The integral in the first summand is the KL divergence between N (µ • 1 , σ 2 ) and N (μ 1 , σ 2 ) while the inner integral of the second summand is the KL divergence between N (µ
. Replacing these integrals with closed-form expressions for these divergences, we get
Denote the above divergence as f (μ 1 ,μ 2r Step 2: µ * 1 = µ 
Since |r * /σ 2 | < 1 due to the conditions on r andr, the sign of the derivative is unchanged when the above is multiplied by [ 
where Y A := µ 
Proof of Proposition 16
Proof shows next generation's belief about second-period fundamental is decreasing as c decreases. Also, since the managers believe in an unconditional negative correlation ρ − +ρ < 0 between X 1 and X 2 , their optimal strategy given any beliefs has the cutoff form and this cutoff is decreasing in their belief about average second-period pool quality.
By the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 7, we can establish that generation 0 managers use a cutoff c (0) with c (0) > c (1) 
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. I check conditions A1 through A5 in Bunke and Milhaud (1998) 
2 no more than δ-distant from (µ decreases exponentially fast in the norm. For |µ 1 | < |µ 2 |, and
So for large enough |µ 2 |, exp(−K 3 · (
2 ) will decrease exponentially fast in the norm. These two facts imply that there is some K > 0 so that whenever ||(µ 1 , µ 2 )|| > K, Since we have assumed that g 1 , g 2 are bounded by M , the prior mass assigned to the sphere S[(µ 1 , µ 2 ), r] is bounded by M 2 times its Euclidean volume. So, take b 2 = 2 and c = πM 2 and the first statement is satisfied. Since we have assumed that g is strictly positive everywhere, the second statement is satisfied.
